Mobile ICBMs are not covered. The Soviet Union considered that, since neither party was renouncing these systems, it should not be subject to a freeze; it also refused to ban them in a future comprehensive agreement. The United States considered that it should be banned because of the control difficulties it presented. In an official statement, the U.S. delegation said that the United States would consider the deployment of land-based mobile ICBMs during the period of the agreement to be inconsistent with its objectives. See Article 7 of the agreement to reduce the risk of a nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed on 30 September 1971, on the agreement establishing the CSSC, which will be drawn up at the beginning of the following SALT negotiations; Until that date, the following rules apply: at the SALT meeting, any consultation desired by both parties in the context of these articles can be carried out by the two SALT delegations; if SALT does not meet, ad hoc agreements can be concluded diplomatically for all desired consultations under these articles. The United States agrees with the principle of the May 6 Soviet Declaration on compliance with commitments from the date of signature, but we want to make it clear that this means that, pending ratification and adoption, neither party is prohibited by the agreements after the agreements enter into force. This agreement would continue to apply without notification from one of the two signatories, as it intends not to pursue ratification or authorization. The Soviet delegation accepted the DECLARATION of the United States. Given the many asymmetries in both countries, the imposition of equivalent restrictions required fairly complex and precise provisions. At the time of the signing, 1,054 land-based ICBMs were in service in the United States, none of which were under construction; the Soviet Union had an estimated 1,618 in operation and construction.

The launchers under construction could be completed. Neither party would begin to build additional ICB launchers during the duration of the agreement – which excludes the relocation of existing launchers. Light or older ICBM launchers cannot be converted into launchers for modern heavy ICT. This prevented the Soviet Union from replacing older missiles with missiles such as the SS-9, which was the largest and most powerful missile in the Soviet inventory in 1972 and which was of particular concern to the United States. Thus, the interim agreement was essentially seen as a holding action intended to complement the ABM Treaty by restricting competition on strategic offensive weapons and allowing time to continue negotiations. The agreement essentially freezes at the existing level the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers operational or under construction on each side and allows SLBM launchers to be increased to an agreed level for each party only by dismantling or destroying an equivalent number of icBM or SLBM missile launchers. The U.S. delegation stressed the importance that the U.S. government attaches to the agreement on more comprehensive restrictions on strategic offensive weapons following the agreement between an ABM treaty and an interim agreement on certain measures to limit strategic offensive weapons.